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Abstract:
This paper analyzes individually-rational ex post equilibrium in the VC
(Vickrey-Clarke) combinatorial auctions. If Σ is a family of bundles of goods,
the organizer may restrict the participants by requiring them to submit their
bids only for bundles in Σ. The Σ-VC combinatorial auctions (multi-good
auctions) obtained in this way are known to be individually-rational truth-
telling mechanisms. In contrast, this paper deals with non-restricted VC
auctions, in which the buyers restrict themselves to bids on bundles in Σ,
because it is rational for them to do so. That is, it may be that when the
buyers report their valuation of the bundles in Σ, they are in an equilibrium.
We fully characterize those Σ that induce individually rational equilibrium in
every VC auction, and we refer to the associated equilibrium as a bundling
equilibrium. The number of bundles in Σ represents the communication
complexity of the equilibrium. A special case of bundling equilibrium is
partition-based equilibrium, in which Σ is a field, that is, it is generated
by a partition. We analyze the tradeoff between communication complexity
and economic efficiency of bundling equilibrium, focusing in particular on
partition-based equilibrium.
1 Introduction
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms [40, 5, 12] are central to the
design of protocols with selfish participants (e.g., [28, 37, 39]), and in partic-
ular for combinatorial auctions (e.g., [41, 18, 8, 42, 24, 26, 19]), in which the
participants submit bids, through which they can express preferences over
bundles of goods. The organizer allocates the goods and collects payments
based on the participants’ bids.1 These protocols allow to allocate a set of
1Motivated by the FCC auctions (see e.g., [6, 21, 22] ) there is an extensive recent
literature devoted to the design and analysis of multistage combinatorial auctions, in
which the bidders express partial preferences over bundles at each stage. See e.g.,[42, 31,
2, 29, 30, 3] .
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goods (or services, or tasks) in a socially optimal (surplus maximizing) man-
ner, assuming there are no resource bounds on the agents’ computational
capabilities.2 The VCG protocols are designed in a way that truth-revealing
of the agents’ private information3 is a dominant strategy to them. Moreover,
VCG protocols can be applied in the context of games in informational form,
where no probabilistic assumptions about agents’ types are required.4 We
shortly define domination and equilibrium in such games. These solutions
are called ex post solutions because they have the property that if the players
were told about the true state, after they choose their actions, they would
not regret their actions.5
In this paper we deal with a special type of VCG mechanisms – the
VC mechanisms. Amongst the VCG mechanisms the VC mechanisms are
characterized by two additional important properties: Truth telling satisfies
the participation constraint, that is, it is preferred to non participation,6 and
the seller’s revenue is always non negative.
2There are at least two sources of computational issues, which arise when dealing
with combinatorial auctions; Winner determination –finding the optimal allocation (see
e.g.,[33, 26, 38, 34, 10, 1, 35, 14]) , and bid communication – the transfer of information
(see e.g., [27]).
3This paper deals with the private-values model, in which every buyer knows his own
valuations of bundles of goods. In contrast, in a correlated-values model, every buyer
receives a signal (possibly about all buyers’ valuation functions), and this signal does not
completely reveal his own valuation function (see e.g. [23, 15, 20, 7, 32, 31] for discussions
of models in which valuations are correlated).
4 A game in informational form is a pre-Bayesian game. That is, it has all the ingre-
dients of a Bayesian game except for the specification of probabilities. Unlike Bayesian
games, games in informational form do not necessarily possess a solution: a recommenda-
tion for rational players how to play. However, in many important models such solutions
do exist. See Section 2 for a precise definition.
5Alternatively, ex post solutions may be called probability-independent solutions be-
cause, up to some technicalities concerning the concept of measurable sets, they form
Bayesian solutions for every specification of probabilities.
6 An equilibrium that satisfies the participation constraint is said to be individually-
rational.
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A famous observation of the theory of mechanism design in economics,
termed the revelation principle (see e.g. [25]), implies that the discussion
of additional individually rational (IR) equilibria of the VC mechanisms may
seem unneeded, and indeed it has been ignored by the literature. It can
be proved that every mechanism with an ex post equilibrium is economically
equivalent to another mechanism – a direct mechanism – in which every agent
is required to submit his information. In this direct mechanism, revealing
the true type is an ex post dominating strategy for every agent, and it yields
the same economics parameters as the original mechanism. However, the two
mechanisms differ in the set of inputs that the player submits in equilibrium.
This difference may be crucial when we deal with communication complexity.
Thus, two mechanisms that are equivalent from the economics point of view,
may be considered different mechanisms from the CS point of view.
Thus, tackling the VC mechanisms from a computational perspective
introduces a vastly different picture. While the revelation of the agents’
types defines one IR equilibrium, there are other (in fact, over-exponentially
many) IR equilibria for the VC auctions. Moreover, these equilibria have
different communication requirements.
In this paper we analyze ex post equilibria in the VC mechanisms.
Let Σ be a family of bundles of goods. We characterize those Σ, for
which the strategy of reporting the true valuation over the bundles in Σ is a
player-symmetric IR ex post equilibrium. An equilibrium that is defined by
such Σ is called a bundling equilibrium. We prove that Σ induces a bundling
equilibrium if and only if it is a quasi field of bundles.7 The number of bundles
in Σ represents the communication complexity of the equilibrium, and the
economic efficiency of an equilibrium is measured by the generated social
surplus. A special type of bundling equilibria are partition-based equilibria,
in which Σ is a field (i.e. it is generated by a partition). The partition-based
7A quasi field is a nonempty set of sets that is closed under complements and under
disjoint unions.
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equilibria are ranked according to the usual partial order on partitions: If
one partition is finer than another one, then it yields higher communication
complexity as well as higher social surplus.8
We analyze the least upper bound (over all possible profiles of valuation
functions, one for each buyer) of the ratio between the optimal surplus and
the surplus obtained in a partition-based equilibrium. We express this least
upper bound in terms of the partition’s structure. We provide an upper
bound for this ratio, which is proved to be tight in infinitely many cases.
In Section 2 we present the concept of ex post equilibrium in games in
informational form. In Section 3 we discuss combinatorial auctions. To-
gether, Sections 2 and 3 provide the reader with a rigorous framework for
general analysis of VC protocols for combinatorial auctions. In Section 4
we introduce bundling equilibrium, and provide a full characterization of
bundling equilibria for VC protocols. Then we discuss bundling equilibrium
that is generated by a partition, titled partition-based equilibrium. In Sec-
tion 5 we deal with the surplus of VC protocols for combinatorial auctions
when following partition-based equilibrium, exploring the spectrum between
economic efficiency and communication efficiency.
2 Ex post equilibrium in games in informa-
tional form
A game in informational form G = G(N,Ω, T, (t˜i)i∈N , X, (ui)i∈N) is de-
fined by the following parameters:
• Agents: Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of agents.
• States: Let Ω be the set of (relevant) states.
8 It is worth mentioning that the various equilibria cannot be ranked according to
the revenue of the seller. That is, under some conditions, a partition-based equilibrium
may simultaneously yield more revenue and less communication complexity than the truth
revealing equilibrium (an example is provided).
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• Types: Let Ti be the set of types of agent i, T = ×i∈NTi.
• Signaling functions: Let t˜i : Ω → Ti be the signaling function of
agent i. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that every type ti ∈ Ti is
possible. That is t˜i(Ω) = Ti.
• Actions: Let Xi be the set of actions of i, X = ×i∈NXi.
• Utility functions: Let ui(ω, x) be the utility of i at state ω, when the
agents choose the action profile x.
Every ω ∈ Ω defines a game in strategic (normal) form, G(ω). In this
game agent i receives ui(ω, x), when it chooses xi, and all other agents choose
x−i. However, the agents do not know which game they play.
For ti ∈ Ti let Ωi(ti) be the set of states that generate the signal ti, that
is
Ωi(ti) = {ω ∈ Ω|t˜i(ω) = ti}.
A strategy9 of i is a function bi : Ti → Xi; The associated implied
strategy is the function bˆi : Ω→ Xi given by
bˆi(ω) = bi(t˜i(ω)).
A profile of strategies b = (b1, · · · , bn) is an ex post equilibrium, if for
every agent i, for every ti ∈ Ti, for every ω ∈ Ωi(ti), and for every xi ∈ Xi,
ui(ω, bi(ti), bˆ−i(ω)) ≥ ui(ω, xi, bˆ−i(ω)).
A strategy bi of i is an ex post dominant strategy for i, if for every
profile of strategies b−i of the other players, for every ti ∈ Ti, for every
ω ∈ Ωi(ti), and for every xi ∈ Xi,
ui(ω, bi(ti), bˆ−i(ω)) ≥ ui(ω, xi, bˆ−i(ω)).
Obviously, if bi is an ex post dominant strategy for every i, b is an ex post
equilibrium, but not necessarily vice versa. An ex post equilibrium b, in
which every strategy bi is ex post dominant is called an ex post domination
equilibrium.
9In this paper we do not deal with mixed strategies.
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3 Combinatorial auctions
In a combinatorial auction there is a seller, denoted by 0, who wishes to sell
a set of m items A = {a1, . . . , am}, m ≥ 1, that are owned by her. There
is a set of (potential) buyers N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, n ≥ 1. We take N as the
set of agents. Let Γ be the set of all allocations of the goods. That is, every
γ ∈ Γ is an ordered partition of A, γ = (γi)i∈N∪{0}. A valuation function
of buyer i is a function vi : 2
A → ℜ, where ℜ denotes the set of real numbers,
with the normalization vi(∅) = 0. In a more general setup, a buyer may care
about the distribution of goods that he does not own. In such a setup the
utility of an agent may depend on the whole allocation γ rather than on γi.
Hence, by dealing with valuation functions we actually assume:
• No allocative externalities.10
We also assume:
• Free disposal: If B ⊆ C, B,C ∈ 2A, then vi(B) ≤ vi(C).
Let Vi be the set of all possible valuation functions of i (obviously Vi = Vj
for all i, j ∈ N), and let V = ×i∈NVi. We refer to V as the set of states
(Ω = V ). In a general model, each buyer receives a signal ti through a
signaling function t˜i defined on V . We assume:
• Private value model: t˜i(v) = vi. That is, Ti = Vi and each buyer
knows his valuation function only.11
A mechanism for allocating the goods is defined by sets of messages
Xi, one set for each buyer i, and by a pair (d, c) with d : X → Γ, and
c : X → ℜn, where X = ×Xi. d is called the allocation function and c the
transfer function; if the buyers send the profile of messages x ∈ X , buyer i
receives the set of goods di(x) and pays ci(x) to the seller. We assume:
•Quasi linear utilities: If agent i with the valuation function vi receives
the set of goods γi and pays ci, his utility equals vi(γi)− ci.
10For auctions in which externalities are assumed see, e.g., [17, 16].
11 See e.g. [23, 15, 20, 7, 32, 31] for discussions of models in which valuations are
correlated and buyers do not know their own valuation.
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As the seller cannot force the buyer to participate, a full description of
a mechanism should describe the allocation of goods and transfers for cases
in which not all agents participate. However, we adopt the way this issue
is treated in economics: The mechanism (X, d, c) defines a game in informa-
tional form. An ex post equilibrium b in this game satisfies the participation
constraint if for every buyer i,
vi(di(b(v)))− ci(b(v)) ≥ 0 for every v ∈ V , (3.1)
where b(v) = (b1(v1), . . . , bn(vn)). If an ex post equilibrium satisfies the
participation constraint, we call it individually rational. If the buyers use
an individually rational ex post equilibrium profile b, then a deviation of a
buyer to non participation is not profitable for him.12 Similarly, a dominant
strategy of i, bi, is individually rational if (3.1) is satisfied for every profile
b−i of the other buyers’ strategies.
For an allocation γ and a profile of types v we denote by S(v, γ) the total
social surplus of the buyers, that is
S(v, γ) =
∑
i∈N
vi(γi).
We also denote:
Smax(v) = max
γ∈Γ
S(v, γ).
Consider a mechanism M = (X, d, c) and an individually rational ex
post equilibrium b. For every profile v we denote the surplus generated
by b by SMb (v) = S(v, d(b(v))), and the revenue collected by the seller by
RMb (v) =
∑
i∈N ci(b(v)).
12 Thus, b remains an ex post equilibrium profile if every set of messages is extended
by a null message, and an agent whose input is null receives no good and pays nothing.
Nevertheless, if the issue of uniqueness of equilibrium is important, dealing with ex post in-
dividually rational equilibrium instead of dealing with ex post equilibrium in the extended
model is not without loss of generality. The extended model may have more equilibrium
profiles, that cannot be expressed in the reduced model, that is, equilibrium profiles in
which some of the agents do not participate in some of the cases.
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Because of the participation constraint,
RMb (v) ≤ SMb (v) ≤ Smax(v) for all v ∈ V .
A mechanism and an individually rational ex post equilibrium (M, b) are
called socially optimal if
SMb (v) = Smax(v) for all v ∈ V .
Note that the seller controls the mechanism, but she does not control the
strategies used by the buyers. However, it is assumed that if the mechanism
possesses an individually rational ex post equilibrium, the agents use such
an equilibrium.13
A public seller may wish to generate a socially optimal mechanism, whereas
a selfish seller may be interested in the revenue function only. Such a seller
would rank mechanisms according to the revenue they generate.
A mechanism (X, d, c) is called a direct mechanism if Xi = Vi for ev-
ery i ∈ N . That is, in a direct mechanism a buyer’s message contains a
full description of some valuation function. A direct mechanism is called
truth revealing if for every buyer i, telling the truth (bi(vi) = vi) is an
individually rational ex post dominating strategy. (Of course the profile of
strategies b = (bi)i∈N is an individually rational ex post equilibrium.) By
the revelation principle,14 given a mechanism and an individually rational
ex post equilibrium (M, b) one can find a direct truth revealing mechanism
that yields the same distribution of goods and the same payments (and in
particular, the same revenue and surplus functions).15 It may seem there-
fore that the concept of ex post equilibrium is not interesting in our setup
13 For example, the agents may reach the equilibrium by a process of learning (see e.g.
[13]).
14See e.g. [25].
15 This strong version of the revelation principle is due to our private values assump-
tion. Otherwise, the revelation principle guarantees the existence of an equivalent direct
mechanism in which telling the truth is an individually rational ex post equilibrium (but
not necessarily a domination equilibrium).
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(private values), and indeed most of the economics literature of mechanism
design with private values deals only with direct and truth revealing mech-
anisms. However, when we deal with computational issues, two mechanism
that are equivalent in economics may differ in their complexity. The time,
space, and communication required to compute and communicate the mes-
sage of an agent as well as the chosen allocation may depend on the messages
sent in equilibrium. Thus, the concept of ex post equilibrium may be very
important even if private values are assumed.
Well-known truth revealing mechanisms are the VC mechanisms. These
mechanisms are parameterized by an allocation function d, that is socially
optimal. That is, Smax(v) = S(v, d(v)) for every v ∈ V . The transfer
functions are defined as follows:
cdi (v) = max
γ∈Γ
∑
j 6=i
vj(γj)−
∑
j 6=i
vj(dj(v)). (3.2)
Note that cdi (v) ≥ 0 for every v ∈ V .
The mechanisms differ in the allocation they pick in cases in which there
exist more than one socially optimal allocation, and therefore in the second
term in (3.2).16 It is well-known that all VC mechanisms yield the same
utility to a truth telling buyer: For a VC mechanism d17 we denote by
udi (vi, (v
′
i, v−i)) the utility of buyer i with the valuation function vi, when he
16By VC mechanisms we refer here to what is also known as Clarke mechanisms or the
Pivotal mechanism. More general mechanisms are the VCG mechanisms. Every VCG
mechanism is obtained from some VC mechanism by changing the transfer functions: A
VCG mechanism is defined by a socially optimal allocation function d and by a family of
functions h = (hi)i∈N . The transfer functions are defined by:
cdi (v) = max
γ∈Γ
∑
j 6=i
vj(γj)−
∑
j 6=i
vj(dj(v)) + hi(v−i).
Truth telling is an ex post equilibrium in every VCG mechanism, but it is not necessarily
an individually rational ex post equilibrium.
17Since in all VC mechanisms M = (X, d, c), X is V and c is defined as in (3.2), it is
enough to specify d in order to specify the mechanism.
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declares v′i and the other buyers declare v−i. That is,
udi (vi, v
′) = vi(di(v
′))− cdi (v′), (3.3)
where v′ = (v′i, v−i). Therefore, by (3.2),
udi (vi, v
′) = S(v, d(v′))− gi(v−i), (3.4)
where v = (vi, v−i), and
gi(v−i) = max
γ∈Γ
∑
j 6=i
vj(γj). (3.5)
If i declares vi,
udi (vi, v) = S(v, d(v))− gi(v−i) = Smax(v)− gi(v−i). (3.6)
As the right-hand side of (3.6) does not depend on d, a truth telling buyer
receives the same utility at all VC mechanisms. Note that truth revealing is
indeed a dominant strategy in a VC mechanism.
In the next section we discuss other (not truth revealing) individually
rational ex post equilibrium profiles in the VC mechanisms. We will focus
on player symmetric equilibria b = (bi)i∈N , where bi = bj for all i, j ∈ N ,
which are in equilibrium in every VC mechanism.
4 Bundling equilibrium
Let Σ ⊆ 2A be a family of bundles of goods. We deal only with such families
Σ for which
• ∅ ∈ Σ.
A valuation function vi is a Σ-valuation function if
vi(B) = max
C∈Σ,C⊆B
vi(C), for every B ∈ 2A.
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The set of all Σ-valuation functions in Vi is denoted by V
Σ
i . We further
denote V Σ = ×i∈NV Σi . For every valuation function vi we denote by vΣi its
projection on V Σi , that is:
vΣi (B) = max
C∈Σ,C⊆B
vi(C), for every B ∈ 2A.
Obviously vΣi ∈ V Σi , and for vi ∈ V Σi , vΣi = vi. In particular (vΣi )Σ = vΣi for
every vi ∈ Vi. Let fΣ : Vi → V Σi be the projection function defined by
fΣ(vi) = v
Σ
i .
An allocation γ is a Σ-allocation if γi ∈ Σ for every buyer i ∈ N . The
set of all Σ-allocations is denoted by ΓΣ.
We are interested in the following question: For which Σ, do we have that
fΣ is a player-symmetric individually rational ex post equilibrium in every
VC mechanism (with any number of buyers)? In such a case we call fΣ a
bundling equilibrium for the VC mechanisms and say that Σ induces a
bundling equilibrium. The next example shows that not every Σ induces a
bundling equilibrium.
Before we present the example we need the following notation: Let B ∈
2A, we denote by wB the following valuation function:
If B 6= ∅, wB(C) = 1 if B ⊆ C, and wB(C) = 0 otherwise.18
If B = ∅, wB(C) = 0 for all C ∈ 2A.
Example 1
Let A contain four goods a, b, c, d. Let
Σ = {a, d, bcd, abc, A, ∅}.19
18For B 6= ∅, a valuation function of the form wB is called a unanimity TU game in
cooperative game theory. An agent with such a valuation function is called by Lehmann,
O’Callaghan, and Shoham [19] a single-minded agent.
19We omit braces and commas when writing subsets of A.
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Let v2 = wa, v3 = wd. Consider buyer 1 with v1 = wbc. Note that vi ∈ V Σi for
i = 2, 3. If buyer 1 uses fΣ he declares v′1(bcd) = v
′
1(abc) = v
′
1(A) = 1 and
v′1(C) = 0 for all other C, and there exists a VC mechanism that allocates a
to 2, d to 3 and bc to the seller. In this mechanism the utility of 1 from using
fΣ is zero. On the other hand, if agent 1 reports the truth (wbc) he receives
(in every VC mechanism) bc and pays nothing. Hence, his utility would be
1. Therefore fΣ is not in equilibrium in this VC mechanism, and hence Σ
does not induce a bundling equilibrium.
4.1 A characterization of bundling equilibria
Σ ⊆ 2A is called a quasi field if it satisfies the following properties:20
• B ∈ Σ implies that Bc ∈ Σ, where Bc = A \B.
• B,C ∈ Σ and B ∩ C = ∅ imply that B ∪ C ∈ Σ.21
Theorem 1 Σ induces a bundling equilibrium if and only if it is a quasi
field.
Proof:
Suppose Σ is a quasi field:
Consider a VC mechanism with an allocation function d. We show that
fΣ is an individually rational ex post equilibrium in this VC mechanism.
Assume that every buyer j, j 6= i, uses the strategy bj = fΣ. Let v−i ∈
V−i. We have to show that for buyer i with valuation vi, v
Σ
i is a best reply
to vΣ−i. As truth revealing is a dominating strategy in every VC mechanism,
it suffices to show that buyer i’s utility when submitting vΣi is the same as
when submitting vi.
22 That is, we need to show that
20Recall our assumption that we deal only with Σ such that ∅ ∈ Σ.
21Equivalently, the union of any number of pairwise disjoint sets in Σ is also in Σ.
22Note that this will imply not only that fΣ is in equilibrium but also that it is indi-
vidually rational.
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Smax(vi, v
Σ
−i)− α = S((vi, vΣ−i), γ)− α,
where α = gi(v
Σ
−i), and γ = d(v
Σ
i , v
Σ
−i).
Hence, we have to show that
Smax(vi, v
Σ
−i) = S((vi, v
Σ
−i), γ). (4.1)
Obviously,
Smax(vi, v
Σ
−i) ≥ S((vi, vΣ−i), γ). (4.2)
As vi(B) ≥ vΣi (B) for every B ∈ 2A,
S((vi, v
Σ
−i), γ) ≥ S((vΣi , vΣ−i), γ) = Smax(vΣi , vΣ−i). (4.3)
Let ξ = d(vi, v
Σ
−i). For j 6= i and j 6= 0, let ξΣj ∈ Σ be such that ξΣj ⊆ ξj
and vΣj (ξ
Σ
j ) = v
Σ
j (ξj). Let ξ
Σ
i = (∪j 6=0,iξΣj )c, and let ξΣ0 = ∅.
Because Σ is a quasi field, ξΣi ∈ Σ, and hence ξΣ ∈ ΓΣ. As ξi ⊆ ξΣi , ξΣ is
also optimal for (vi, v
Σ
−i). However
S((vi, v
Σ
−i), ξ
Σ) = S((vΣi , v
Σ
−i), ξ
Σ) ≤ Smax(vΣi , vΣ−i). (4.4)
Combining (4.2), (4.3), and (4.4) yields
Smax(v
Σ
i , v
Σ
−i) ≥ Smax(vi, vΣ−i) ≥ S((vi, vΣ−i), γ) ≥ Smax(vΣi , vΣ−i).
Therefore (4.1) holds.
Suppose Σ induces a bundling equilibrium:
We first show that if B ∈ Σ, then Bc ∈ Σ. If B = A then by definition
Bc = ∅ ∈ Σ. Let B ⊂ A. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that Bc 6∈ Σ.
Let v2 = wB and v1 = wBc . Note that v
Σ
2 = v2. Thus, if buyer 2 uses f
Σ, he
declares v2. If buyer 1 uses f
Σ, he declares vΣ1 , where v
Σ
1 (B
c) = 0. Hence,
there exists a VC mechanism d, that allocates B to agent 2 and Bc to the
seller. However, if buyer 1 deviates and declares his true valuation, then this
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VC mechanism allocates to him Bc, and he pays nothing. Hence, there is a
profitable deviation from fΣ, a contradiction.
Next, we show that if B,C ∈ Σ are disjoint then B ∪ C ∈ Σ. By the
first part of the proof, it suffices to show that (B ∪ C)c ∈ Σ. Clearly, we
may assume that the sets B, C, and (B ∪ C)c are all non empty. Assume,
for the sake of contradiction, that (B ∪C)c /∈ Σ. Consider three buyers with
valuations v1 = w(B∪C)c , v2 = wB, v3 = wC . Proceeding as in the first part
of the current part of the proof yields a similar contradiction.
It may be useful to note that if fΣ is a buyer-symmetric equilibrium for
a fixed set of buyers, then Σ is not necessarily a quasi field. For example,
if there is only one buyer, every Σ such that A ∈ Σ induces an equilibrium.
In the case of two buyers, being closed under complements is necessary and
sufficient for Σ to induce an equilibrium. However, it can be deduced from
the proof of the only if part of Theorem 1, that for a fixed set of buyers N ,
if n = |N | ≥ 3, then Σ must be a quasi field if it induces an equilibrium for
the set of buyers N .
4.2 Partition-based equilibrium
Let pi = {A1, ..., Ak} be a partition of A into non empty parts. That is,
Ai 6= ∅ for every Ai ∈ pi, ∪ki=1Ai = A, and Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for every i 6= j. Let
Σpi be the field generated by pi. That is, Σpi contains all the sets of goods
of the form ∪i∈IAi, where I ⊆ {1, ..., k}. To avoid confusion: ∅ ∈ Σpi. For
convenience, we will use fpi to denote fΣpi . A corollary of Theorem 1 is:
Corollary 1 fpi is a bundling equilibrium.
Proof: As Σpi is a field it is in particular a quasi field. Hence, the proof
follows from Theorem 1.
A bundling equilibrium of the form fpi, where pi is a partition, will be
called a partition-based equilibrium. Thus, a partition-based equilibrium
is a bundling equilibrium fΣ that is based on a field Σ = Σpi. It is important
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to note that there exist quasi fields, which are not fields. For example, let
A = {a, b, c, d}. Σ = {ab, cd, ac, bd, A, ∅} is a quasi field, which is not a field.
We note, however, that when m = |A| ≤ 3, the notions of quasi field and
field coincide.
5 Surplus and communication complexity
Let Σ ⊆ 2A. If every buyer uses fΣ, then in every VC mechanism d, the
total surplus generated when the types of the buyers are given by v ∈ V is
S(vΣ, d(vΣ)) = Smax(v
Σ).
We denote
SΣ−max(v) = max
γ∈ΓΣ
S(v, γ).
Obviously,
SΣ−max(v) = SΣ−max(v
Σ) = Smax(v
Σ), for every v ∈ V .
For convenience we denote SΣ−max by SΣ, and we call SΣ the Σ-optimal
surplus function (note that S2A = Smax). When Σ is a field generated by
a partition pi we write Spi for SΣpi .
If Σ is a quasi field we say that the communication complexity of the
equilibrium fΣ is the number of bundles in Σ, that is |Σ|. Notice that this is
a natural definition because a buyer who is using fΣ has to submit a vector
of |Σ| numbers to the seller.23 Thus, if pi is a partition, the communication
complexity is 2|pi|. If Σ1 ⊆ Σ2, then SΣ1(v) ≤ SΣ2(v) for every v ∈ V . So, Σ2
induces more surplus (a proxy for economic efficiency) than Σ1, but Σ2 also
induces higher communication complexity. Hence, there is a tradeoff between
economic efficiency and computational complexity. The next example shows
23A discussion of the way this can be extended to deal with the introduction of concise
bidding languages [26, 4] is beyond the scope of this paper.
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that as far as the revenue of the seller is concerned, there is no clear com-
parison between the revenues obtained by quasi fields ranked by inclusion.24
Before we present the example, note that for two partitions pi1, pi2, Σpi1 ⊆ Σpi2
if and only if pi2 refines pi1.
Example 2
Assume there are two buyers, N = {1, 2}, and two goods, A = {a, b}.
Assume v1 = wa and v2 = wb. In any VC mechanism, in the truth revealing
equilibrium buyer 1 gets a, buyer 2 gets b, and they pay nothing. Hence
the level of social surplus is 2 and the revenue of the seller at v = (v1, v2) is
zero. Let pi be the trivial partition {A} (Σpi = {∅, A}). If each buyer uses
the equilibrium strategy fpi, they both report wA. Hence, one of the buyers
gets ab and pays 1. The seller collects a revenue of 1, and the social surplus
equals 1. Hence, Smax(v) > Spi(v) and R(v) < Rpi(v). On the other hand,
if N = {1, 2, 3, 4} where v1 and v2 are defined as before and v3 = v1 and
v4 = v2, Smax(v) = 2 and R(v) = 2 while Spi(v) = 1 and Rpi(v) = 1.
For every family of bundles Σ with A ∈ Σ we define
rnΣ = sup
v∈V,v 6=0
Smax(v)
SΣ(v)
, (5.1)
where V = V1 × · · · × Vn. Thus, rnΣ is a worst-case measure of the economic
inefficiency that may result from using the strategy fΣ when there are n buy-
ers. Obviously rnΣ ≥ 1, and equality holds for Σ = 2A. A standard argument
using homogeneity and continuity of Smax/SΣ shows that the supremum in
(5.1) is attained, i.e., it is a maximum.
The following remark gives a simple upper bound on the inefficiency as-
sociated with Σ.
Remark 1 For every Σ ⊆ 2A with A ∈ Σ, and for every v ∈ V ,
Smax(v) ≤ nSΣ(v),
24 In spite of our example, it is commonly believed that social optimality is a good proxy
for revenue. This was proved to be asymptotically correct when the number of buyers is
large, and the organizer has a Bayesian belief over the distribution of valuation functions,
which assumes independence across buyers (see [24]).
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where n is the number of potential buyers. Consequently,
rnΣ ≤ n.
Proof: Let γ = d(v), where d is any VC mechanism.
Smax(v) = S(v, γ) =
∑
i∈N
vi(γi) ≤
∑
i∈N
vi(A) =
∑
i∈N
vΣi (A) ≤ nSΣ(v).
However, we are interested mainly in upper bounds on the economic in-
efficiency that are independent of the number of buyers. For every family of
bundles Σ with A ∈ Σ we define
rΣ = sup
n≥1
rnΣ. (5.2)
It is easy to see that, since any allocation assigns non empty bundles to at
most m = |A| buyers, the supremum in (5.2) is attained for some n ≤ m.
When Σ = Σpi for a partition pi, we write rpi instead of rΣpi .
In the following subsection we characterize and estimate rpi, thereby ob-
taining a quantitative form of the tradeoff between communication and eco-
nomic efficiency in partition-based equilibria.
5.1 Communication efficiency vs. economic efficiency
in partition-based equilibria
We first express rpi in terms of the partition pi = {A1, ..., Ak} only. A feasible
family for pi is a family ∆ = (Hi)
s
i=1 of (not necessarily distinct) subsets of
{1, ..., k} satisfying the following two conditions:
• Hi ∩Hj 6= ∅ for every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ s.
• |{i : l ∈ Hi}| ≤ |Al| for every 1 ≤ l ≤ k.
We write s = s(∆) for the number of sets in the family ∆ (counted with
repetitions).
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Theorem 2 For every partition pi,
rpi = max s(∆),
where the maximum is taken over all families ∆ that are feasible for pi.
Proof:
We first prove that rpi ≤ max s(∆). It suffices to show that for every
v ∈ V there exists a feasible family ∆ for pi such that
Smax(v) ≤ s(∆) · Spi(v).
Let v ∈ V . Let γ be a socially optimal allocation. That is,
Smax(v) =
∑
i∈N
vi(γi).
For every γi let γ
pi
i be the minimal set in Σpi that contains γi. That is
γpii = ∪l∈JiAl where Ji = {l ∈ {1, . . . , k} : Al ∩ γi 6= ∅}.
Let ξ be a partition of N to r subsets, such that for every i, j ∈ I ∈ ξ,
i 6= j, γpii ∩ γpij = ∅. Assume r is the minimal cardinality of such a partition.
For every I ∈ ξ let HI = ∪i∈IJi. That is, each HI is a set of indices of parts
Al in pi that should be allocated to the buyers in I in order for each of them
to get the goods they received in the optimal allocation γ. Note that if I 6= J ,
HI ∩HJ 6= ∅, otherwise we can join I and J together in contradiction to the
minimality of the cardinality of ξ. Hence, ∆ = (HI)I∈ξ is a family of subsets
of {1, ..., k} that satisfies that any two subsets in ∆ intersect. Furthermore,
the second condition for feasibility is also satisfied, because for any given
l ∈ {1, ..., k} there are at most |Al| buyers i with γi ∩ Al 6= ∅, and hence at
most |Al| parts I ∈ ξ such that l ∈ HI . Thus, ∆ is a feasible family for pi
with s(∆) = r.
Every HI , I ∈ ξ defines a Σpi-allocation. In this allocation every i ∈ I
receives γpii , and the seller receives all other goods. Therefore
∑
i∈I vi(γ
pi
i ) ≤
Spi(v) for every I ∈ ξ. Hence,
Smax(v) ≤
∑
i∈N
vi(γ
pi
i ) =
∑
I∈ξ
∑
i∈I
vi(γ
pi
i ) ≤
∑
I∈ξ
Spi(v) = rSpi(v).
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Next, we prove that rpi ≥ max s(∆). It suffices to show that for every
feasible family ∆ for pi there exists a profile of valuations v = (v1, ..., vn) 6= 0
for some number n of buyers satisfying
Smax(v) ≥ s(∆) · Spi(v).
Let ∆ = (Hi)
s
i=1 be a feasible family for pi. By the second condition of
feasibility, we can associate with each Hi a set of goods Bi containing one
good from each Al such that l ∈ Hi, in such a way that the sets Bi are
pairwise disjoint. By the first condition of feasibility, for every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ s
there can be no two disjoint sets Ci, Cj ∈ Σpi such that Bi ⊆ Ci, Bj ⊆ Cj.
Now, we take n = s buyers, and let buyer i have the valuation vi = wBi .
Then Smax(v) = s whereas Spi(v) = 1.
Theorem 2 reduces the determination of the economic inefficiency measure
rpi to a purely combinatorial problem. However, this combinatorial problem
does not admit an easy solution.25 Nevertheless, we will use Theorem 2 to
calculate rpi in some special cases, and to obtain a general upper bound for
it which is tight in infinitely many cases.
The following proposition determines rpi for partitions pi with a small
number of parts. We use the notations ⌊·⌋ and ⌈·⌉ for the lower and upper
integer rounding functions, respectively.
Proposition 1 Let |A| = m, and let pi = {A1, ..., Ak} be a partition of A
into k non empty sets.
• If k = 1 then rpi = m.
• If k = 2 then rpi = max{|A1|, |A2|}. Consequently, the minimum of rpi
over all partitions of A into 2 parts is ⌈m
2
⌉.
25The special case of this problem, in which |Ai| = |Aj | for all Ai, Aj ∈ pi, has been
treated in the combinatorial literature using a different but equivalent terminology (see
e.g. [11]). But even in this case, a precise formula for max s(∆) seems out of reach.
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• If k = 3 then rpi = max{|A1|, |A2|, |A3|, ⌊m2 ⌋}. Consequently, the mini-
mum of rpi over all partitions of A into 3 parts is ⌊m2 ⌋.
Proof:
In each case, we determine the maximum of s(∆) over all families ∆ that
are feasible for pi.
For k = 1, a feasible family consists of at most |A1| = m copies of {1},
and therefore max s(∆) = m.
A feasible family for k = 2 cannot contain two sets, Hi and Hj , such
that 1 /∈ Hi and 2 /∈ Hj , because such sets would be disjoint. Hence, for any
feasible family ∆, either all sets contain 1 or all of them contain 2. Therefore,
s(∆) ≤ max{|A1|, |A2|}. On the other hand, feasible families of size |A1|, |A2|
trivially exist.
Suppose k = 3, and denote
βl = |Al| for l = 1, 2, 3.
We first show that s(∆) ≤ max{β1, β2, β3, ⌊m2 ⌋} for every feasible family ∆.
If ∆ contains some singleton {l}, then all sets in ∆ must contain l, and hence
s(∆) ≤ βl. Otherwise, ∆ consists of s12 copies of {1, 2}, s13 copies of {1, 3},
s23 copies of {2, 3}, and s123 copies of {1, 2, 3}, for some non negative integers
s12, s13, s23, s123. We have the following inequalities:
s12 + s13 + s123 ≤ β1,
s12 + s23 + s123 ≤ β2,
s13 + s23 + s123 ≤ β3.
Upon adding these inequalities we obtain
2(s12 + s13 + s23) + 3s123 ≤ m,
which implies
s(∆) = s12 + s13 + s23 + s123 ≤ ⌊m
2
⌋.
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We show next that there exists a feasible family ∆ with s(∆) = max{β1, β2, β3, ⌊m2 ⌋}.
If this maximum is one of the βl’s, this is trivial. So assume that βl < ⌊m2 ⌋
for l = 1, 2, 3. If m is even then the family ∆ that consists of
s12 =
β1 + β2 − β3
2
copies of {1, 2},
s13 =
β1 + β3 − β2
2
copies of {1, 3},
s23 =
β2 + β3 − β1
2
copies of {2, 3},
is feasible (note that the prescribed numbers are non negative because βl <
⌊m
2
⌋ for l = 1, 2, 3, and they are integers because β1 + β2 + β3 = m is even).
The size of this family is s(∆) = s12 + s13 + s23 =
m
2
. If m is odd, we
make slight changes in the values of s12, s13, s23: we add
1
2
to one of them
and subtract 1
2
from the other two. In this way we get a family ∆ with
s(∆) = ⌊m
2
⌋.
We see from Proposition 1 that if we use partitions into two parts (en-
tailing a communication complexity of 4), the best we can do in terms of
economic efficiency is rpi = ⌈m2 ⌉, and this is achieved by partitioning A into
equal or nearly equal parts. Allowing for three parts (and therefore a com-
munication complexity of 8) permits only a small gain in rpi (in fact, no gain
at all when m is even).
We will now state the two parts of our main result.
Theorem 3 Let pi = {A1, ..., Ak} be a partition of A into k non empty sets
of maximum size β(pi). (That is, β(pi) = max{|A1|, ..., |Ak|}.) Then
rpi ≤ β(pi) · ϕ(k),
where
ϕ(k) = max
j=1,...,k
min{j, k
j
}.
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The proof of Theorem 3 is given in the following subsection.
Note that
ϕ(k) ≤
√
k.
In particular, if all sets in pi have equal size m
k
, we obtain the upper bound
rpi ≤ m√
k
.
Now, consider the case when, for some non negative integer q, we have
k = q2 + q + 1, and (5.3)
|Ai| = q + 1 for i = 1, ..., k. (5.4)
In this case
ϕ(k) =
q2 + q + 1
q + 1
,
and hence the upper bound of Theorem 3 takes the form
rpi ≤ k.
The second part of our main result implies that in infinitely many of these
cases this upper bound is tight.
Theorem 4 Let pi = {A1, ..., Ak} be a partition that satisfies (5.3) and (5.4)
for some q which is either 0 or 1 or of the form pl where p is a prime number
and l is a positive integer. Then
rpi = k.
We prove Theorems 3 and 4 in the following subsection.
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5.2 Proofs of Theorems 3 and 4
We begin with some preparations. Let ∆ = (Hi)
s
i=1 be a family of (not
necessarily distinct) subsets of {1, ..., k}. A vector of non negative numbers
δ = (δi)
s
i=1 is called a semi balanced
26 vector for ∆ if for every l ∈ {1, ..., k},
∑
i:l∈Hi
δi ≤ 1.
Proposition 2 Let ∆ = (Hi)
s
i=1 be a family of (not necessarily distinct)
subsets of {1, ..., k} such that Hi ∩ Hj 6= ∅ for every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ s. Let
δ = (δi)
s
i=1 be a semi balanced vector for ∆. Then
s∑
i=1
δi ≤ ϕ(k),
where
ϕ(k) = max
j=1,...,k
min{j, k
j
}.
Proof:
Assume without loss of generality that h = |H1| is the minimal number
of elements in a member of ∆. The proposition will be proved if we prove
the following two claims:
Claim 1:
∑s
i=1 δi ≤ h.
Claim 2:
∑s
i=1 δi ≤ kh .
Proof of Claim 1:
Let z =
∑
l∈H1
∑
i:l∈Hi δi. As every Hi intersects H1, every δi appears in z
at least once. Therefore, z ≥ ∑si=1 δi. Because δ is semi balanced,∑i:l∈Hi δi ≤
1 for every l, and in particular for l ∈ H1. Hence, z ≤ ∑l∈H1 1 = h.
26This concept is equivalent to what is called a fractional matching in combinatorics.
We chose the term semi balanced, because balanced vectors, defined by requiring equality
instead of weak inequality, are a familiar concept in game theory (see e.g. [36]).
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Proof of Claim 2:
Let w =
∑k
l=1
∑
i:l∈Hi δi. Every δi appears in w exactly |Hi| times. Since
|Hi| ≥ h for every i, we have w ≥ h∑si=1 δi. On the other hand, as in the
proof of Claim 1, we obtain w ≤ ∑kl=1 1 = k. Combining the two inequalities,
we get
∑s
i=1 δi ≤ kh .
Therefore,
s∑
i=1
δi ≤ min{h, k
h
} ≤ ϕ(k).
We are now ready for the proof of Theorem 3:
Proof of Theorem 3:
Let pi = {A1, ..., Ak} be a partition of A into k non empty sets of maximum
size β(pi). We have to prove that rpi ≤ β(pi) ·ϕ(k). By Theorem 2, it suffices
to show that for every feasible family ∆ for pi, we have
s(∆) ≤ β(pi) · ϕ(k).
Let ∆ = (Hi)
s
i=1 be such a family. Consider the vector δ = (δi)
s
i=1 with
δi =
1
β(pi)
, i = 1, ..., s.
By the second condition of feasibility, this vector is semi balanced. Hence we
may apply Proposition 2 and conclude that
s∑
i=1
δi ≤ ϕ(k),
or equivalently,
s
β(pi)
≤ ϕ(k),
as required.
In order to prove Theorem 4 we invoke a result about finite geometries
(see e.g. [9]). A finite projective plane of order q is a system consisting
of a set Π of points and a set Λ of lines (in this abstract setting, a line is
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just a set of points, i.e., L ⊆ Π for every L ∈ Λ), satisfying the following
conditions:
• |Π| = |Λ| = q2 + q + 1.
• Every point is incident to q+1 lines and every line contains q+1 points.
• There is exactly one line containing any two points, and there is exactly
one point common to any two lines.
Such a system does not exist for every q. However, it trivially exists for q = 0
(a single point) and for q = 1 (a triangle) and it is known to exist for every q
of the form q = pl, where p is a prime number and l is a positive integer. The
first non trivial example, corresponding to q = 2, is called the Fano plane:
Π = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7},
Λ = {124, 235, 346, 457, 561, 672, 713}.
Proof of Theorem 4:
Let pi = {A1, ..., Ak} be a partition that satisfies (5.3) and (5.4) for some
q which is either 0 or 1 or of the form pl where p is a prime number and l
is a positive integer. As rpi ≤ k follows from Theorem 3 (see the discussion
preceding the statement of Theorem 4), we need to prove only that rpi ≥ k.
By Theorem 2, it suffices to show that there exists a family ∆ with s(∆) = k
which is feasible for pi. Such a family is given by the system of lines of a
projective plane of order q, when the points are identified with 1, ..., k.
5.3 More on the ranking of equilibria
The tradeoff between communication complexity and economic efficiency, as
delineated above, may be made concrete by the following scenario. Suppose
that a set A of m goods is given, and we are in a position to recommend to
the potential buyers an equilibrium strategy. Assume further that a certain
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level M of communication complexity is considered the maximum acceptable
level. If we are going to recommend a partition-based equilibrium fpi, then
the number of parts in pi should be at most k = ⌊log2M⌋. From the viewpoint
of economic efficiency, we would like to choose such a partition pi with rpi as
low as possible. Which partition should it be?
According to Theorem 3, we obtain the lowest guarantee on rpi by making
the maximum size of a part in pi as small as possible, which means splitting
A into k equal (or nearly equal, depending on divisibility) parts. This leads
to the question whether, for given m and k, the lowest value of rpi itself (not
of our upper bound) over all partitions pi of A into k parts is achieved at an
equi-partition, i.e., a partition pi = {A1, ..., Ak} such that ⌊mk ⌋ ≤ |Ai| ≤ ⌈mk ⌉,
i = 1, ..., k.
While Proposition 1 gives an affirmative answer for k = 1, 2, 3, it turns
out, somewhat surprisingly, that this is not always the case. This is shown
in the following example.
Example 3
Let m = 21 and k = 7. If pi is an equi-partition of the 21 goods into
7 triples then, by Theorem 4, rpi = 7. Consider now a partition pi
′ =
{A1, ..., A7} in which
|A1| = 2, |A2| = 4, |A3| = · · · = |A7| = 3.
We claim that rpi′ ≤ 6.
In order to prove this, it suffices to show that there exists no feasible
family of 7 sets for pi′. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that ∆ =
(Hi)
7
i=1 is such a family. Let Hi be an arbitrary set in ∆. It follows from the
second condition of feasibility that if Hi contains the element 1 then it shares
it with at most one other set in ∆. Similarly, if Hi contains the element 2
then it shares it with at most three other sets in ∆. For l = 3, ..., 7, if Hi
contains the element l then it shares it with at most two other sets in ∆. This
implies that Hi must contain at least three elements (because it must share
an element with every other set, and 3 + 2 < 6). Moreover, if Hi contains
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exactly three elements and one of them is 1, then it also contains 2 (since
1 + 2 + 2 < 6). On the other hand, we have
7∑
i=1
|Hi| =
7∑
i=1
∑
l∈Hi
1 =
7∑
l=1
∑
i:l∈Hi
1 =
7∑
l=1
|{i : l ∈ Hi}| ≤
7∑
l=1
|Al| = 21.
Since every Hi has at least three elements, it follows that every Hi has exactly
three elements, and all the weak inequalities |{i : l ∈ Hi}| ≤ |Al| must in fact
hold as equalities. In particular, there exist two sets in ∆, say Hi and Hj ,
that contain the element 1. By the above, they both contain 2 as well. Let
l be the third element of Hi. Then among the remaining five sets in ∆, the
set Hi shares the element 1 with none of them, it shares the element 2 with
two of them, and the element l with at most two of them. This contradicts
the fact that Hi intersects every other set in ∆.
It can be checked that in fact rpi′ = 6 and this is the lowest achievable
value among all partitions of 21 goods into 7 sets. We omit the detailed
verification of this.
The tradeoff between communication complexity and economic efficiency
was quantitatively analyzed above only for partition-based equilibria. It is
natural to ask whether it is possible to beat this tradeoff using the more
general bundling equilibria. The answer is, in a sense made precise below:
sometimes yes, but not by much.
Example 4
Assume that the number of goods m is even, and let the set of goods A
be partitioned into two equal parts B and C. Consider Σ ⊆ 2A defined by
Σ = {D ⊆ A : |D ∩ B| = |D ∩ C|}.
It is easy to check that Σ is a quasi field, and hence it induces a bundling
equilibrium. The communication complexity is
|Σ| =
m/2∑
j=0
(
m/2
j
)2
=
m/2∑
j=0
(
m/2
j
)(
m/2
m/2− j
)
=
(
m
m/2
)
.
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We claim that rΣ = 2. That rΣ ≥ 2 can be seen by taking two buyers
with valuations wB and wC, respectively. To see that rΣ ≤ 2, suppose that
v is a profile of valuations for a set of buyers N , and let γ be an optimal
allocation. Split the set N into the following two sets:
NB = {i ∈ N : |γi ∩B| ≥ |γi ∩ C|},
NC = {i ∈ N : |γi ∩B| < |γi ∩ C|}.
Note that the sets of goods γi, i ∈ NB, can be expanded to pairwise disjoint
sets of goods that belong to Σ. In other words, there exists a Σ-allocation ξ
such that γi ⊆ ξi for every i ∈ NB. Similarly, there exists a Σ-allocation η
such that γi ⊆ ηi for every i ∈ NC . Hence
Smax(v) =
∑
i∈N
vi(γi) =
∑
i∈NB
vi(γi)+
∑
i∈NC
vi(γi) ≤
∑
i∈N
vi(ξi)+
∑
i∈N
vi(ηi) ≤ 2SΣ(v).
Thus, rΣ ≤ 2.
We claim further that if a partition pi of A satisfies rpi ≤ 2 then |Σpi| ≥
2m−2. Indeed, suppose pi = {A1, ..., Ak}. It is easy to find a feasible family
of 3 sets for pi if one of the Al’s has three or more elements, or if three of
the Al’s have two elements each. Therefore, rpi ≤ 2 implies that at most two
of the sets A1, ..., Ak have two elements and the rest are singletons. Thus
k ≥ m− 2 and |Σpi| ≥ 2m−2.
Since
(
m
m/2
)
< 2m−2 for all even m ≥ 10, we have the following conclusion:
If m ≥ 10 then every partition-based equilibrium that matches the economic
efficiency of fΣ has a higher communication complexity than fΣ. In other
words, the quasi field Σ offers an efficiency/complexity combination that
cannot be achieved or improved upon (in the Pareto sense) by any field.
The above example notwithstanding, the efficiency/complexity combina-
tions which arise from arbitrary quasi fields are still subject to a tradeoff that
is not much better than for fields. This is the content of our final remark.
Remark 2 Let m = |A| and let k be a positive integer. Any quasi field
Σ ⊆ 2A with rΣ ≤ mk must contain a partition of A into k non empty parts,
and therefore must satisfy |Σ| ≥ 2k.
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Proof:
Let there be m buyers, each with valuation wa for a distinct a ∈ A. For
this v we have Smax(v) = m. If rΣ ≤ mk then we must have SΣ(v) ≥ k. Hence
an optimal Σ-allocation has to assign non empty bundles of goods to at least
k buyers. Thus Σ contains k pairwise disjoint non empty sets of goods, and
therefore, being a quasi field, also a partition of A into k non empty parts.
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